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s might be expected, the 
nationwide controversy 
over the legitimacy and le- 
gality of assisted suicide 
has had its most immediate impact in 
Michigan, the home state of assisted 
suicide’s most visible practitioner, Dr. 
Jack Kevorkian. Although public 
opinion polls in Michigan show 
strong support for assisted suicide in 
certain circumstances, and for that 
matter, for Dr. Kevorkian himself, ef- 
forts to “Stop Kevorkian” have long 
been a prominent feature of the 
Michigan legal and political scene. 
Kevorkian’s activity has been strongly 
opposed by a number of legislators 
and prosecutors, and by the politi- 
cally powerful Michigan Right to Life 
lobby. 
During the 1992-93 session of the 
Michigan legislature, a number of 
bills dealing with assisted suicide were 
introduced, ranging from permitting 
assisted suicide in certain circum- 
stances to completely prohibiting it in 
all circumstances. Faced with this 
politically charged and highly contro- 
versial issue, the Michigan legislature 
decided to do what legislatures often 
do in such a situation-appoint a 
blue ribbon commission to study the 
matter.’ However, the day before the 
agreed-upon bill establishing the 
study commission was to be voted on 
in the Michigan House, Kevorkian 
performed another of his now famil- 
iar assisted suicides, which, as usual, 
received nationwide media coverage. 
This renewed the legislative clamor 
to “Stop Kevorkian” and “[not] let 
Michigan become the nation’s sui- 
cide capitol.” The study commission 
bill was then amended on the floor of 
the House to add a provision making 
assisted suicide a criminal offense, 
and the amended bill was quickly 
passed by the House and the Senate 
and signed into law by the governor. 
I am a professor of constitutional 
law at Wayne State University Law 
School in Detroit and am one of the 
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The Constitution 
and Hastening 
Inevitable Death 
By Robert A. Sedler 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the right of terminally ill persons to hasten their 
inevitable death. In prohibiting physicians from prescrib- 
ing lethal medications by which such patients might hasten 
death, Michigan’s ban on “assisted suicide” unconstitution- 
ally imposes an “undue burden” on the exercise of that 
right. 
lawyers litigating the American Civil 
Liberties Union’s constitutional chal- 
lenge to Michigan’s assisted suicide 
ban. In this article, I will discuss the 
ACLU’s substantive constitutional 
challenge to the ban, which I helped 
to formulate. The basis of that chal- 
lenge is that the ban on assisted sui- 
cide is unconstitutional insofar as it 
prohibits terminally ill patients from 
making use of physician-prescribed 
medications to hasten their inevitable 
death. The ACLU further challenged 
the process by which the ban was 
enacted as violating provisions of the 
state constitution,” as well as arguing 
that the law was unconstitutionally 
vague and indefinite. I will argue 
here that the ban imposes an “undue 
burden” on what I maintain is the 
constitutionally protected right of 
terminally ill patients to hasten inevi- 
table death. In doing so, I frame the 
issue differently from opponents of 
assisted suicide, as, for example, Pro- 
fessor Yale Kamisar’s contention re- 
cently advanced in this journal that 
laws prohibiting assisted suicide do 
not violate the U.S. Constitution? 
A distinguished constitutional 
scholar has observed, “Once taken 
into our constitutional system, the di- 
alogue takes on a new seriousness. It 
is, therefore, critically important that 
we get the questions right and the 
answers right, because constitutional 
law is written in concrete and is not 
easily washed out by rain or  tear^."^ 
The “right question,” as regards the 
ACLU challenge to Michigan’s ban 
on assisted suicide, is not, I would 
submit, whether there is a constitu- 
tional “right to assisted suicide” or a 
constitutional “right to die.” Rather 
the right question, framed in the con- 
text of this particular constitutional 
challenge, is whether an absolute ban 
on the use of physician-prescribed 
medications by a terminally ill person 
to hasten that person’s inevitable 
death, if and when the person chooses to 
do so,. is an “undue burden” on the 
person’s “liberty” interest protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause, and so is unconstitu- 
tional. 
On Behalf of the Terminally Ill 
As in many constitutional cases, an 
understanding of the basis of the 
ACLU challenge to Michigan’s ban 
on assisted suicide must begin by 
looking at the people who are bring- 
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ing the challenge and at how the ban 
affects what it is that they want to do. 
The ACLU did not bring the constitu- 
tional challenge to the law on behalf 
of Dr. Kevorkian (by tacit mutual 
agreement the ACLU and Dr. 
Kevorkian have kept at some consid- 
erable distance fiom each other), on 
behalf of proponents of “voluntary 
euthanasia,” or on behalf of nonter- 
minally ill persons who wish to termi- 
nate an “unbearable existence.” The 
principal plaintiffs in the case are ter- 
minally ill cancer patients who want 
to have the chuice to hasten their inevi- 
table death by taking a lethal dose of 
physician-prescribed medications, 
and physicians who want to prescribe 
medications so that their patients will 
have this choice. The physician plain- 
tiffs do not want to give lethal injec- 
tions to terminally ill patients or per- 
form voluntary euthanasia in any way 
whatsoever, and the patient plaintiffs 
do not want to have their lives ended 
by means of lethal injections. What 
the patient plaintiffs do want and 
what the physician plaintiffs do want 
to provide is patient empowerment to 
hasten inevitable death. The physi- 
ci,ans want to be permitted, when they 
consider this to be medically appro- 
priate, to provide their patients with 
barbiturates, opiates, and other med- 
ications in sufficient quantities that 
the patients may, at any time of their 
own choosing, immediately termi- 
nate their lives by consuming a lethal 
dosage of the available medications. 
In this respect, patient empower- 
ment encompasses both pain control 
and the hastening of inevitable 
death. The patient takes the medica- 
tions to relieve pain, but if the pain 
becomes so unbearable that he or she 
no longer wants to continue living 
with it, the patient can “take the 
whole bottle,” so to speak, and bring 
the suffering to a merciful end. 
Unlike Dr. Kevorkian’s assisted sui- 
cides, and unlike voluntary euthana- 
sia, patient empowermentmeans that 
there is no physician intervention at 
the time of death, and that the physi- 
cian is not directly involved with the 
patient’s death at all. There are no 
“suicide machines” or television 
cameras. There is no appointed time 
at which the physician comes to the 
patient’s home or hospital room to 
administer the lethal injection. Every- 
thing is entirely in the patient’s con- 
trol. Only the patient, or family mem- 
bers or friends if the patient so 
chooses, will know of the patient’s de- 
cision before it is carried out. The 
only sign of death is the empty bottle. 
The patient herself has determined 
the timingof her inevitable death and 
of her release fiom unbearable pain 
and suffering. 
for the purpose of enabling the 
patient to use the medications to 
hasten inevitable death. The law 
states that it does not apply “to pre- 
scribing, dispensing or administering 
medications or procedures if the in- 
tent is to relieve pain or discomfort 
and not to cause death, even if the 
medication of procedure may hasten 
or increase the risk of death.”5 This 
Once the right of termhilly ill patients to hasten their 
inevitable death is f d y  established as a matter of law, 
much of the controversy over assisted suicide may dissi- 
pate by its own force. 
I would further submit that once 
the right of terminally ill patients to 
hasten their inevitable death by the 
use of physician-prescribed medica- 
tions is firmly established as a matter 
of constitutional law, much of the 
controversy over assisted suicide may 
dissipate by its own force. At least the 
controversy will no longer involve the 
terminally ill. Once it is understood 
by both physicians and patients that 
physicians are legally permitted to 
prescribe lethal medications in such 
quantities as to empower the termi- 
nally ill patient to hasten inevitable 
death, there will no longer be any 
need for Dr. Kevorkian and his sui- 
cide machine. And there may not 
even be a need for voluntary euthana- 
sia. A terminally ill patient will be able 
to obtain the necessary quantity of 
lethal medications from her physi- 
cian, and ifthe particular physician 
refuses to prescribe them, the patient 
can simply find another physician. If 
I am correct in this contention, then 
the controversy over assisted suicide, 
at least as regards terminally ill 
patients, may well have been super- 
seded by the constitutional recogni- 
tion of patient empowerment to 
hasten inevitable death. 
The problem for doctors and 
patients in Michigan, however, is that 
the Michigan legislature has defined 
“assisted suicide” to include the pre- 
scription of lethal medications by a 
physician to a terminally ill patient 
means that if the physician prescribes 
lethal medications in sufficient quan- 
tities to cause death and instructs the 
patient how to use the medications 
for that purpose, the physician will be 
found to have the “intent to cause 
death,” and so will be @ty of a viola- 
tion of the law. 
Indeed, the ban is more sweeping 
still. Under the law, no terminally ill 
person in Michigan, no matter how 
excruciating that person’s pain and 
suffering, will be able to receive any 
assistance whatsoever, either fiom a 
physician or from a family member or 
friend, in implementing that person’s 
decision to hasten his or her own in- 
evitable death. Under the law, a per- 
son is guilty of “criminal assistance to 
suicide” if she “has knowledge that 
another person intends to commit or 
attempt to commit suicide and inten- 
tionally (a) provides the physical 
means by which the other person at- 
tempts or commits suicide or (b) par- 
ticipates in a physical act by which the 
other person attempts or commits 
suicide.”6 The only intent necessary 
for a violation of the law is the intent 
to “provide the physical means” or 
“participate in a physical act,” with 
the “knowledge that another person 
intends to commit or attempt to com- 
mit suicide.” T h e  need not be any intat 
that the otherperson commit suicide. So, if 
a terminally ill person has told a 
spouse or friend “I sometimes wish I 
could die,” and the spouse or friend 
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responds to a request for a glass of 
water that the terminally ill person 
uses to swallow a lethal dose of medi- 
cation, the spouse or friend is guilty 
of violating the law. Furnishing the 
“physical means” with the knowledge 
that a person has “threatened sui- 
cide” is sufficient to subject the 
spouse or friend to up to four years’ 
imprisonment. 
Opponents of assisted suicide 
agree with this result. Professor 
Kamisar, for example, insists that a 
ban on assisted suicide should prop 
erly extend even to the terminally ill. 
This is because, he says, there is no 
principled way to distinguish for con- 
stitutional purposes between the ter- 
minally ill and others who desire 
“death by suicide.” 
I will respond to Professor Kami- 
sar’s “constitutional identity” argu- 
ment shortly. But “constitutional 
identity” aside, in the real world we 
have no difficulty iden-ng and dis- 
tinguishing the terminally ill. They 
are patients who will die from a 
specific disease within a relatively 
short period of time. Their medical 
treatment is limited to alleviating 
their pain, and the only thing that is 
not certain is the precise point in 
time when their death will occur. 
They thus constitute a distinct and 
identifable class of persons, clearly 
separate from all other persons who 
might seek “death by suicide.” 
I find it appalling that the pejora- 
tive label “suicide” would be put on 
a terminally ill person’s choice to 
hasten his or her inevitable death. 
In no meaningful sense of the term 
can a choice to hasten one’s own 
inevitable death by the use of physi- 
cian-prescribed medications be 
labeled a “suicide.” The term con- 
jures up the image of a person 
jumping off a bridge or “blowing his 
brains out.” The terminally ill per- 
son, who is facing death, and who 
seeks to have the choice to hasten 
that inevitable death, is not “com- 
mitting suicide” by ending a life that 
otherwise is of indefinite duration. 
The life of the terminally ill person is 
coming to an end, and the question 
is whether the terminally ill person 
must undergo unbearable suffering 
until death comes “naturally,” or 
whether that person can make the 
choice to end the unbearable suffer- 
ing by the use of physician-prescribed 
medications. 
Professor Kamisar does not say very 
much about the terminally ill, em- 
phasizing instead that most people 
who commit suicide are in fact not 
terminally ill.’ He, along with most 
other opponents of “assisted suicide,” 
is rather uncomfortable when talk- 
ing about the terminally ill and so 
quickly brushes them off. Opponents 
of assisted suicide then start down 
the familiar slippery slope, suggest- 
ing that once we start allowing ter- 
minally ill people to hasten their in- 
evitable death, we are but a few steps 
away from putting all “old and sick 
people” on the modern equivalent of 
an “ice floe” and ridding ourselves of 
the “inconvenience” of having to 
care for them.8 
Because he wishes to ignore the 
terminally ill to the extent possible, 
Professor Kamisar says that the ACLU 
is simply engaging in “good advocacy 
tactics” when it restricts its challenge 
to the terminally ill. As I have ex- 
plained above, the ACLU challenge 
to Michigan’s assisted suicide ban in- 
volves only the constitutionality of 
that ban as applied to terminally ill 
people, because only terminally ill 
people and physicians treating termi- 
n d y  ill people are seeking to chal- 
lenge the ban in this case. Moreover, 
the challenge is not to the law’s 
general prohibition against assisted 
suicide-the plaintiffs do not care 
about a ban on Dr. Kevorkian’s sui- 
cide machine or a ban on physician- 
administered lethal injections-but 
only to the ban on physician-pre- 
scribed medications that would em- 
power terminally ill people to make 
the choice to hasten their inevitable 
death. 
For this reason, the constitutional 
issue presented in the ACLU chal- 
lenge is relatively narrow and quite 
specific. It is also the issue that o p  
ponents of assisted suicide find the 
most troubling, because they cannot 
give any justification, moral or other- 
wise, for requiring terminally ill 
people to continue to undergo un- 
bearable pain and suffering and for 
denying them the right to hasten 
their inevitable death. Rather than 
invoke the spectre of the slippery 
slope, a justification of the ban on its 
merits might begin with an admission 
that opponents of assisted suicide af- 
firmatively do want to prohibit termi- 
nally ill people from using physician- 
prescribed medications to hasten 
their inevitable death. 
Litigation in the Constitutional 
System 
The fact that the issue presented in 
the ACLU challenge to Michigan’s 
ban on assisted suicide is quite 
specific is not simply good advocacy 
tactics. Nor is it “the technique of 
overcoming opposition to a desired 
goal by proceeding step-by-step.’” It U 
the way that constitutional issues are s u p  
posed to be litigated in the Amm‘cun wn- 
stitutional system. 
In the American system, constitu- 
tional law develops in a “line of 
growth,” on a case-by-case, issue-by- 
issue basis. Indeed, it is a fundamen- 
tal principle of constitutional adju- 
dication that “constitutional issues 
will not be determined in broader 
terms than are required by the pre- 
cise facts to which the ruling is to be 
applied.”” The meaning of a consti- 
tutional provision develops in- 
crementally, and that provision’s line 
of growth strongly influences its a p  
plication in particular cases.” 
The line of growth of constitutional 
doctrine is clearly illustrated by the 
development of constitutional pro- 
tection of a woman’s right to have an 
abortion. This constitutional protec- 
tion of abortion is part of the consti- 
tutional protection afforded to the 
broader interest of reproductive free- 
dom, which in turn is a part of the 
even broader “liberty” interest that is 
textually protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause. 
The constitutional protection of re- 
productive freedom as a due process 
liberty interest traces back to a 1942 
Supreme Court decision holding un- 
constitutional the “discriminatory” 
sterilization of convicted felons.“ 
The concept of reproductive free- 
dom as a “fundamental right,” first 
recognized by the Court in that case, 
was later invoked by the Court to hold 
unconstitutional a ban on the use of 
contraceptives by married couples,I3 
and then a ban on access to contra- 
ceptives by unmarried persons.14 So 
when, in the 19’73 case of Roe u. Wade,,’’ 
the Court had to confront the consti- 
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tutionality of antiabortion laws, re- 
productive freedom had already 
been established as a fundamental 
right, and the question before the 
Court was whether the state’s interest 
in protecting potential human l ie  
was “sufficiently compelling” to 
justify a prohibition on a pregnant 
woman’s entitlement to a medical 
abortion. The Court held that it was 
not “sufficiently compelling” prior to 
the stage of viability, and so in effect 
held that a woman had a “constitu- 
tional right” to an abortion.16 
We see then how constitutional 
doctrine develops incrementally, case- 
by-case, issue-by-issue. The ACLU’s 
constitutional challenge to Michi- 
gan’s assisted suicide ban thus does 
not involve a claimed “right to as- 
sisted suicide” or a claimed “right to 
die.” It involves the specific question 
of whether the “liberty” protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause embraces the right of a 
terminally ill person to hasten inevi- 
table death, and ifso, whether Michi- 
gan’s absolute ban on the use of phy- 
sician-prescribed medications to 
hasten inevitable death is unconstitu- 
tional as imposing an “undue bur- 
den” on that right. In actua’l constitu- 
tional litigation, that issue must be 
confronted directly with reference to 
applicable constitutional doctrine 
and the Court’s precedents, and it 
cannot be avoided by slippery slope 
and “but what if“ kinds of arguments. 
While such arguments may be appro- 
priate for academic and political dis- 
course, they have no place in consti- 
tutional litigation and cannot be re- 
lied on to avoid confronting the 
specific constitutional issue pre- 
sented in the case before the court. 
The Right to Hasten Inevitable 
Death 
Let me now briefly summarize the 
constitutional argument on the 
specific issue that is presented in the 
ACLU challenge to Michigan’s ban 
on assisted suicide. The fist part of 
the argument is that the “liberty” pro- 
tected by the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment’s due process clause embraces 
the right of a terminally ill person to 
hasten inevitable death. Here we 
argue that the essence of the “liberty” 
protected by the due process clause is 
personal autonomy. This means that a 
person has the right to bodily integri- 
ty, to control his or her own body, and 
to define his or her own existence. As 
the Supreme Court recently stated in 
Casey : 
It is a promise of the Constitution 
that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government 
may not enter. . . . It is settled now 
. . . that the Constitution places 
limits on a State’s right to inter- 
fere with a person’s most basic 
decisions about family and 
parenthood, as well as bodily in- 
tegrity. . . . At the heart of liberty is 
the right to define one’s own con- 
cept of existence, of [the] mean- 
ing of the universe, and of the 
mystery o f  human life. Beliefs 
about these matters could not de- 
fine the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under com- 
pulsion of the state.” 
A person’s entitlement to bodily in- 
tegrity and control over one’s own 
body protects a person’s right to re- 
fuse unwanted medical treatment, in- 
cluding the right of a competent 
adult to make the personal decision 
tected by the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment’s due process clause. 
The second part of the argument is 
that an absolute ban on the use of 
physician-prescribed medications im- 
poses an undue burden. on the right of 
a terminally ill person to hasten inevi- 
table death. This part of the argu- 
ment is likewise based on the Cmey 
decision, where the Supreme Court 
held that the state may not impose an 
undue burden on the exercise of a 
person’s fundamental right to bodily 
integrity and control over his or her 
own body. In that case, the Court held 
that a law imposes an undue burden 
on the exercise of a woman’s right to 
have an abortion when it places a sub 
stantial obstaclein the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus. Thus the government may not 
prohibit a woman from having an 
abortion prior to viability. Nor may it 
require notification to a married 
woman’s husband of her intention to 
have an abortion, since the threat 
that her husband may commit an act 
of violence against her would effec- 
tively prevent a small number of 
women from making the decision to 
have an abortion. 
A ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications 
obviously places a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
terminally ill person seeking to hasten inevitable death. 
to discontinue lifesaving medical 
treatment.’* It protects the right of a 
woman to have an abortion and the 
right of all persons to use contracep 
tion to prevent pregnancy. For the 
same reasons as people have aright to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment, 
to have an abortion, and to use con- 
traception, we contend that a termi- 
nally ill person’s right to control over 
that person’s own body must include 
the right to make decisions about the 
voluntary termination of that per- 
son’s lie. Thus, we contend that the 
decision of a terminally ill person to 
hasten inevitable death involves an 
important liberty interest that is pro- 
To say the least, a ban on the use of 
physician-prescribed medications ob- 
viously places a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a terminally ill person 
seeking to hasten that person’s inevi- 
table death. Indeed, a more extreme 
burden on the exercise of that right 
cannot be imagined, and for this rea- 
son we contend the ban on the use of 
physician-prescribed medications is 
unconstitutiona~.’~ 
Professor Kamisar, of course, does 
not address the constitutionality of a 
ban because he insists on the “consti- 
tutional identity” of all self-inflicted 
deaths; that is, he insists that for con- 
stitutional purposes there is no prin- 
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cipled way to distinguish between ter- 
minally ill persons seeking to hasten 
their inevitable death and anybody 
else desiring “death by suicide.” In 
arguing that any constitutional pro- 
tection to a “right to die” does not 
include protection to a “right to as- 
sisted suicide,” he says that there is a 
difference between the withholding 
or withdrawal of life-sustaining medi- 
cal treatment and afE2matively com- 
from occurring and her right to have 
an abortion to terminate a pregnancy 
that has already occurred, the right of 
a terminally ill person to bodily in- 
tegrity includes the right to hasten 
inevitable death, both by discontinu- 
ing lifesaving medical treatment and 
by taking a lethal dose of physician- 
prescribed medications. 
Looking to the Supreme Court’s 
ringing affirmation of the right of 
conceivable interest in “preserving 
life.” Quite to the contrary, it does 
nothing more than force a terminally 
ill person to undergo continued un- 
bearable suffering until death merci- 
fully intervenes. 
Getting the Question Right 
As stated at the outset, in constitu- 
tional litigation it is “critically impor- 
tant that we get the questions right 
and the answers right.” The question 
presented in the ACLU challenge to 
Michigan’s ban on assisted suicide is 
specifiucally whether the absolute ban 
on the use of physician-prescribed 
medications by terminally ill people 
to hasten their inevitable death is an 
“undue burden” on the liberty pro- 
tected by the Fourteenth Amend- 
The Constitution equally protects the person’s right to 
choose not to hasten inevitable death. 
mitting suicide. This observation is 
true. But it is also completely irrele- 
vant to resolving whether the right of 
terminally ill persons to hasten their 
inevitable death is a protected “lib- 
erty” interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause 
and whether an absolute ban on the 
use of physician-prescribed medica- 
tions is an undue burden on the exer- 
cise of that right 
Rather, the resolution of these is- 
sues must take place with reference to 
constitutional doctrine relating to the 
right of personal autonomy that has 
been promulgated by the Supreme 
Court. We have discussed this doctrine 
above, particularly the Court’s applica- 
tion of that doctrine in the recent Cmey 
decision. Professor Kamisar does not 
explicate any principled difference, 
in t m  of the constitutional doctn’ne re- 
lating to the right of personal autonomy, 
between the right of a competent ter- 
minally ill person to hasten inevitable 
death by refusing to continue life-sus- 
taining medical treatment, and the 
right of the same competent termi- 
nally ill person to hasten inevitable 
death by the use of physician-pre- 
scribed medications. No such prin- 
cipled difference can be found in the 
applicable constitutional doctrine, 
and Professor Kamisar does not sug- 
gest any. Just as the personal auton- 
omy reflected in the constitutional 
right of reproductive freedom pro- 
tects both the right of a woman to use 
contraception to prevent pregnancy 
personal autonomy in Casey I would 
submit that terminally ill persons do 
indeed have the right to make the 
“most basic decisions about bodily in- 
tegrity,” that they have the right to 
“define [their] own concept of exist- 
ence” and “the attributes of [their] 
personhood,” without the “compul- 
sion of the state,” and that they have 
the right to make the choicewhether 
to continue to undergo unbearable 
suffering until death comes “natu- 
rally” or to hasten their inevitable 
death by the use of physician-pre- 
scribed medications. The right to 
make this choice is surely a right 
protected by the “liberty” of the Four- 
teenth Amendment’s due process 
clause, and Michigan’s absolute ban 
on terminally ill persons using physi- 
cian-prescribed medications to has- 
ten their inevitable death clearly im- 
poses an undue burden on this right. 
The state cannot assert any valid 
interest in requiring a terminally ill 
person to undergo unbearable pain 
and suffering until death comes “nat- 
urally.” The interest typically asserted 
to justify a ban on assisted suicide is 
that of “preserving life,” or as Profes- 
sor Kamisar puts it, in preventing the 
disregard for l i e  that he sees result- 
ing &om a “suicide-permissive” soci- 
ety.20 But there can be no valid interest in 
“preserving life” when there is no “lqe k ?  
to preServe. ” A ban on the use of phy- 
sician-prescribed medications by a 
terminally ill person to hasten inevi- 
table death does not advance any 
ment’s due process clause. In this ar- 
ticle, I have tried to demonstrate why 
the answer to this question, in terms 
of the constitutional doctrine appli- 
cable to the right of personal auton- 
omy, should be resoundingly in the 
affirmative. 
However, a holding that a ban on 
assisted suicide is unconstitutional as 
applied to prohibit the use of physi- 
cian-prescribed medications by ter- 
minally ill people to hasten their in- 
evitable death is only a holding on 
this specific and narrow issue. The 
holding will be a relevant precedent 
in a hture case involving the constitu- 
tionality of a law that prohibits “sui- 
cide assistance” to a person who is not 
terminally ill, or that prohibits “sui- 
cide machines” or “physician eutha- 
nasia,” but it will not be controlling. 
As a precedent, the case will have rec- 
ognized that the right of terminally ill 
persons to hasten inevitable death is a 
right entitled to significant constitu- 
tional protection. Whether or not 
that precedent will be extended in 
future cases will be determined only 
if and when those cases arise. 
In arguing that the Constitution 
should not protect a “right to assisted 
suicide,” Professor Kamisar says that 
in certain circumstances life may be 
“unendurable” for one who is not ter- 
minally ill, and asks if that person 
should have the same “right to as- 
sisted suicide” that is being asserted 
for one who is terminally ill (p. 36). 
The question for the Court in such a 
case, as in all constitutional cases in- 
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volving personal autonomy, would be 
whether the state can assert a valid 
justiJicutiun for the particular interfer- 
ence with that autonomy. Perhaps the 
state’s interest in preventing a “sui- 
cide-permissive” society is of suffi- 
cient importance to outweigh the in- 
terest of a nonterminally ill person in 
ending a life that has become “unen- 
durable.’’ But perhaps it is not.” The 
question can only be answered when 
it arises, and must be answered in 
light of the constitutional doctrine 
applicable to the right of personal 
autonomy that has been promul- 
gated by the Supreme Court. Again, 
the state’s justification for the ban on 
assisted suicide must be balanced 
against the resulting interference 
with the personal autonomy of the 
person seeking to end a life that that 
person no longer wishes to endure, 
and this justification may or may not 
be found sufficient in the balancing 
equation. Constitutional protection 
to the right of personal autonomy is 
even-handed in the sense that auton- 
omy means the right to choose be- 
tween available alternatives. The 
same Constitution that I submit pro- 
tects the right of a terminally ill per- 
son to choose to hasten inevitable 
death equally protects that person’s 
right to choose not to hasten inevi- 
table death. The spectre of putting 
the “old and sick” on the modern 
equivalent of the ice floe thus would 
be constitutionally impermissible. 
More specifically, governmental ef- 
forts to “ration” medical care are sub- 
ject to serious constitutional chal- 
lenge precisely because they interfere 
with the right of “old and sick” 
people and of people who are termi- 
nally ill to make the choice to “go on 
with their lives.” I seriously doubt that 
the justification of “we have to con- 
trol medical costs,” and “treatment 
won’t do them any good anyway,”will 
be found to be constitutionally s a i -  
cient to overcome a person’s “right to 
go on living.” 
The issue in the ACCU challenge to 
Michigan’s assisted suicide ban, how- 
ever, is whether the state can prohibit 
terminally ill persons fi-om using phy- 
sician-prescribed medications to 
hasten their inevitable death. I hope 
that I have succeeded in demon- 
strating why I think the state cannot 
constitutionally do so. 
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